It has become apparent in recent years is that advanced economy government bond markets can also experience investor outflows, and associated runs. Our new research shows that advanced economies’ exposure to refinancing risk and changes in government borrowing costs depend mainly on who is holding the bonds— the demand side for government debt. Tracking who owns what, when and for how long can shed some light on potential risks in advanced economies’ government debt markets.
Despite a host of reforms in the right direction, the financial structures that were in place before the global crisis have not actually changed that much, and they need to if the global financial system is to become a safer place.
In response to the global crisis, policymakers around the world are instituting the broadest reform of financial regulation since the Great Depression. Some in the financial industry claim the long run economic costs of these global reforms outweigh the benefits. But our new research strongly suggests the opposite—the reforms are well worth the money.
Many of the root causes of the euro area crisis still need to be addressed before the system is stabilized and returns to health. Until this is done, global financial stability is likely to remain well within the “danger zone,” where a misstep or failure to address underlying tensions could precipitate a global crisis with grave economic and financial consequences.
Central Banks, Financial Regulators, and the Quest for Financial Stability: 2011 IMF Annual Research Conference
The global financial crisis gave economists pause for thought about what should be the future of macroeconomic policy. We have devoted much of our thinking to this issue these past three years, including how the many policy instruments work together. The interactions between monetary and macroprudential policies, in particular, remain hotly debated. This topic goes to the core of central banks’ mandates, and their role in achieving macroeconomic and financial stability. While the financial crisis triggered a fundamental rethinking of these issues, much research—both conceptual and empirical—remains to be done. I hope this year’s IMF Annual Research Conference will contribute to expanding the frontier of knowledge on this topic.
Drug traffickers, diamond smugglers, and terrorists’ financiers around the world have one thing in common: they abuse the financial system to “clean” the proceeds they have obtained from their illegal work, or to transfer funds to achieve their destructive aims. The former is known as money laundering and the latter as terrorist financing. The IMF has worked with countries to combat money laundering and terrorist financing for over 10 years. With the benefit of all this experience, we decided it was time to consider a new, risk-focused approach to add depth to the way we assess money laundering and terrorist financing.
Folklore is riddled with tales of a lone actor undoing a titan: David and Goliath; Heracles and Atlas; Jack and the Beanstalk, to name a few. Financial institutions seen as too important to fail have become even larger and more complex since the global crisis. We need look no further than the example of investment bank Lehman Brothers to understand how one financial institution’s failure can threaten the global financial system and create devastating effects to economies around the world. We’ve been looking at how to fix the too important to fail problem, and favor market based measures to help reduce the likelihood and impact of a failure. Global regulators have come up with a new set of tighter rules for all banks, known as Basel III, as a starting point to make the system less risky and address a number of regulatory issues. Implementation may take several years, however, while systemic institutions continue to grow in size and complexity, and may resume their risky practices. So in the interim, we’d like to see rapid, credible, and visible actions.
The near collapse of the financial system that set off the global crisis was due in part to financial institutions suddenly lacking access to funding markets, and liquidity drying-up across securities markets. Financial institutions did not factor in how their own responses to a liquidity shortfall could make the entire system shut down. But, it only takes a few institutions to pull the plug on a liquidity-filled bathtub before it runs dry, and the central bank needs to open the spigots again. The key then is to make sure that firms have less incentive to pull the plug. To do that, in the latest Global Financial Stability Report, we have come up with a way to measure how much an individual financial institution contributes to system-wide liquidity risk.
In times of crisis, choices must be made. In the most recent global economic crisis, policymakers moved quickly to stabilize the system, providing massive financial support, which is the right response in the beginning of any crisis. But that only treated the symptoms of the global financial meltdown, and now a rare opportunity is being thrown away to tackle the underlying causes. In our new paper, we analyze the policy choices made during the crisis and compare them to a number of past ones. It turns out the phases of this crisis followed the same pattern as previous ones, but policymakers made different choices this time around. This post lays out the lessons that we should learn.